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ENSURING THE CONTINUITY OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT: THE PRESIDENCY
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2003,

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION,
Washington, DC.
The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room
SR–325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Trent Lott and Hon.
John Cornyn, presiding.
Present: Senators Lott, Cornyn, DeWine, Dodd, and Feingold.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT LOTT, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Chairman LOTT. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you all for being here this morning. I know that there are
a number of people that are interested in this issue that have responsibilities on the floor of the Senate right now. Senator Feingold
did leave to go down to do a statement and will be returning shortly, and we expect other Senators will be joining us as we go forward this morning.
This is a joint hearing, and I am really pleased to be able to cochair this with the Senator from Texas, Senator Cornyn, who is
Chairman of the Subcommittee with jurisdiction in this area, and
who has really been focusing on continuity of Government and succession issues, and has brought a vigor and an interest in this that
really has been very helpful.
As I have gotten into this subject myself, I have become more
and more interested and more and more concerned about where we
are today in terms of Presidential succession. And so I think it is
appropriate we have these hearings. I want to thank our witnesses
for being here today. I will give you an appropriate introduction in
a few minutes, and we will look forward to hearing from you.
I want to begin with an interesting historical anecdote about the
Senate Rules and Administration Committee and the issue of Presidential succession. After a major Senate reorganization in 1946,
the Senate Rules Committee was merged with the Senate Privileges and Elections Committee, and the Senate Rules and Administration Committee was officially created in January 1947.
The first public hearings held by the newly created Committee
were on the subject of Presidential succession and how the system
should be remodeled to deal with the advent of the atomic bomb,
interestingly enough, the death of President Franklin Roosevelt,
and other issues that were related to this subject.
(1)
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Since those 1947 hearings, no substantive legislation has been
passed to deal with the gaps in the current Presidential succession
system. So I think it is way past time for us to have these hearings, consider these matters, and hopefully even find a way to act.
There are many areas where there is a gap in our planning for unexpected disasters, and this is obviously right at the top of that list.
I have long been interested in this subject. Earlier this year, the
Rules and Administration Committee considered and reported out
S. 148, a bill by Senator DeWine and others, which added the Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge to the line of
Presidential succession. As you can see from the chart—do we have
our chart up here?—Table 1, Secretary Ridge would be eighth in
line of succession after the Attorney General. This bill has already
passed the full Senate and is awaiting action in the House.
Given the circumstances of the world today, it is vitally important that we have a system of Presidential succession that operates
efficiently and effectively with minimal interruption. Since September 11, 2001, Congress has been studying all aspects of our
Government’s operations to ensure that we continue to function in
the event of a catastrophe.
The current statutes governing the Presidential succession system, as we have already noted, have not been dealt with since
1947. President Harry Truman was very insistent on this area
being considered, but as a result of what happened with Harry
Truman becoming President, the Vice Presidency remained vacant
from 1945 to 1949. After several years of work from President Truman, Congress finally amended the Presidential succession statutes. As a result, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 was
adopted, and it is still in force today.
Amazingly, the United States has been without a sitting Vice
President on 18 separate occasions. As recently as 1963, when Lyndon Johnson ascended to the Presidency as a result of the assassination of President Kennedy, we did not have a Vice President
from 1963 to 1965. And during Johnson’s Presidency, many people
worried about the situation. If a tragedy should befall President
Johnson, what would happen? And we might have been faced with
a difficult situation replacing the President as there was no Vice
President and the sitting speaker, John McCormack, born in 1891,
and President pro tem Carl Hayden, born in 1877, were certainly
well advanced in years.
In 1965, as a result of Johnson’s ascension to the Presidency with
no Vice President waiting in the wings, the 89th Congress proposed
the 25th Amendment to the Constitution. This amendment is a
critical piece of the succession puzzle as we know it today, and we
have used it twice already, when Jerry Ford was selected as Vice
President and ultimately he became President, and then with the
selection of Nelson Rockefeller. I was on the House Judiciary Committee at the time, Senator Cornyn, and was the first one to have
an opportunity—on the Committee that had the first opportunity
to deal with the confirmation process of a Vice President under the
25th Amendment.
While the issue of Presidential succession has just recently regained the national spotlight, this issue has been debated and discussed over the years. In fact, during those very first hearings in
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1947, the Chairman of the Rules and Administration Committee,
Senator Wayland Brooks of Illinois, proposed forming a joint committee to deal specifically with the issue of Presidential succession.
And there have been a plethora of succession issues that have been
proposed over the years but no actions taken.
When I have looked at the hearings on that, there are some very
interesting quotes from the Senators that were involved in that,
and they apply to today. Of course, in those days, they were worried just about the atom bomb. Well, you know, that is still a factor
we have to consider, a dirty bomb or a nuclear bomb or some other
travesty that could occur, and we could have a real mess on our
hands.
Another problem with it, of course, is the bumping procedure
that might be employed whereby, you know, the Speaker might become President for a while, but then once a Vice President would
be selected, I guess the Speaker would be bumped back to the position he had previously held. There would be a problem with how
an interim Speaker would be selected. A real musical chairs could
occur.
I think the area that really is the most interesting is the fact
that even though it was not always the case, we have Members of
Congress in the line of succession. I understand from the readings
that I have been doing that that issue was never really settled by
our Founding Fathers and probably would pretty heatedly debated.
But if you look back just in recent history where if something had
happened to President Clinton and Vice President Gore, Newt
Gingrich could have at one point become President. Then there
would be a problem with selecting a new Speaker and what would
you do with the Cabinet. It has been described as that sort of thing
could cause not a succession but a revolution in a way. And we
have got another chart up there that points out how many times—
you know, what would have happened if this had occurred, both
with Democrat and Republican administrations.
For the past 50 years, there have been many, many years where
you had Congress controlled by one party and the Presidency the
other. So this is an area that we need to think about.
I do not want to tell Senator Stevens this yet, but I really have
come to the conclusion that congressional leaders should be taken
out of the line of succession. We will have to make it prospective
so that Denny Hastert and Ted Stevens will be happy with that.
But I think it is a real problem, and I have for years.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lott appears as a submission
for the record.]
So I am glad we are having this hearing. Again, I want to thank
our panel of witnesses. But before I introduce them, let me call on
Senator Cornyn, who has really been doing good work in this and
other related issues, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF TEXAS

Senator CORNYN. Well, thank you, Senator Lott, for those thorough introductory remarks, and thank you for your leadership on
this important hearing.
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As you recounted, the Senate Rules Committee has jurisdiction
over the Presidential succession statute, and the Senate Judiciary
Committee has jurisdiction over constitutional issues through the
Subcommittee that I chair, the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights. So today’s joint hearing of the two Committees on the topic of Presidential succession
is quite appropriate—and after 9/11, some 2 years later, quite important.
I want to thank Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, who, shortly after I spoke on this subject on the Senate
floor, invited me to chair the hearings for the full Judiciary Committee, which, of course, I gratefully accepted. And I want to thank
him again today for his leadership and for giving these issues the
serious consideration that they deserve.
Last Tuesday, I chaired the first in a series of hearings on continuity issues to examine serious weaknesses in our ability to ensure the continuity of Congress. Fortunately, with respect to today’s hearing, the Constitution gives us ample authority to ensure
the continuity of the Presidency, even as it may be inadequate with
respect to Congress itself. Unfortunately, however, the current
Presidential succession law, enacted, as you heard from Senator
Lott, in 1947, has long troubled the Nation’s top legal scholars,
some of whom we have here today, across the political spectrum as
both unconstitutional and unworkable.
This is an intolerable situation. We must have a system in place
so that it is always clear and always beyond doubt who the President is, especially in times of national crisis.
Yet our current succession law fails badly under that standard.
Imagine the following scenarios.
The President and Vice President are both killed. Under the current law, next in line to act as President is the Speaker of the
House. Suppose, however, that the Speaker is a member of the
party opposite of the now deceased President and that the Secretary of State, acting out of party loyalty, asserts a competing
claim to the Presidency. The Secretary argues that Members of
Congress are legislators and, thus, are not officers who are constitutionally eligible to serve as President. Believe it or not, the
Secretary actually has a rather strong case, in my view. In fact, he
can cite for support the views of James Madison, the father of our
Constitution, who argued this precise point in 1792.
Who is the President? Whose orders should be followed by our
armed forces, by our intelligence agencies, and by domestic law enforcement bureaus? If lawsuits are filed, will courts accept jurisdiction? How long will they take to rule? How will they rule? And how
will their rulings be respected?
Or imagine, once again, the President and Vice President are
killed, and the Speaker is a member of the opposite party. This
time, however, the Speaker declines the opportunity to act as President in a public-minded effort to prevent a change in party control
of the White House as a result of a terrorist attack. The Secretary
of State thus becomes the Acting President. In subsequent weeks,
however, the Secretary takes a series of actions that upset the
Speaker. The Speaker responds by asserting his right under the
statute to take over as Acting President.
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The Secretary counters that he cannot constitutionally be removed from the White House by anyone other than the President
or Vice President because under the Constitution he is entitled to
act as President until the disability of the President or Vice President is removed or a President shall be elected. Confusion and litigation ensue. Again, who is President?
Or imagine that the President, Vice President, and Speaker are
all killed, along with numerous Members of Congress, for example,
as a result of an attack during the State of the Union address. The
remaining Members of the House, a small fraction of the entire
membership representing just a narrow geographic region of the
country and a narrow portion of the ideological spectrum, claim
that they can constitute a quorum and then attempt to elect a new
Speaker. That new Speaker then argues that he is Acting President. The Senate President pro tem and the Secretary of State each
assert competing claims of their own that they are President.
Again, who is President?
Or, finally, notice that the President, Vice President, Speaker,
Senate President pro tem, and the Members of the Cabinet all live
and work in the greater Washington, D.C., area. Now imagine how
easy it would be for a catastrophic terrorist attack in Washington
to kill or incapacitate the entire line of succession to the Presidency
as well as the President himself. Then who would be President?
In each of these scenarios, we do not know for sure who the
President is. A chilling thought for all Americans. In an age of terrorism and a time of war, this is no longer mere fodder for Tom
Clancy novels or episodes of ‘‘West Wing.’’
These nightmare scenarios are serious concerns after 9/11. On
that terrible day, Federal officers ordered dramatic evacuations of
the White House, even shouting at White House staffers, ‘‘Run.’’ On
that day, the Secret Service executed its emergency plan to protect
and defend the line of Presidential succession for the first time ever
in American history, according to some reports. In subsequent
months, the President and Vice President were constantly kept
separate for months and months after 9/11, precisely out of the fear
that the continuity of the Presidency might otherwise be in serious
jeopardy.
I believe we must fix the Presidential succession law, and fix it
now, so that these nightmare scenarios will never come true and
will never again be able to haunt the American people or our form
of Government.
I look forward to the testimony, Mr. Chairman, of these exceptional witnesses and to learn what suggestions they might have for
reforming the Presidential succession law. After all, we have had
2 years since 9/11 to do this. Two years is too long, and the time
to plan for the unthinkable is now.
Thank you, Senator Lott.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn appears as a submission for the record.]
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
Senator DeWine, we already gave you credit for your interest in
these succession issues, and I have noted that your legislation, S.
148, passed the Senate June 26th and is now pending before the
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House. We would be glad to hear any opening statement you would
like to make at this time.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE DEWINE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OHIO

Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, I will be very, very brief. I just
want to congratulate you and Senator Cornyn for holding this hearing.
As you both have said, there are almost unimaginable scenarios
that are not unimaginable, that certainly could happen, that compel us to take action and to address these concerns. And 2 years
is too long. It is time for this Congress to take action. It is time
for this Congress to address the concerns that we have.
And so I am very, very happy that we are holding this hearing
today. It is about time.
Thank you.
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Senator DeWine.
Our first witness is Professor Akhil Amar. Mr. Amar has served
as a distinguished law professor at Yale University for two decades
and has been extensively published on the issues of Presidential
succession and the U.S. Constitution. He is considered one of the
foremost authorities on the subject of Presidential succession and
the Constitution.
Dr. John Fortier—is that the correct pronunciation?—is an accomplished scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and serves
as Executive Director for the Continuity of Government Commission. He has written and studied on these issues of governmental
continuity as well as Presidential succession.
And Mr. Miller Baker is a partner in the law firm of McDermott
Will & Emery. He previously served as counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee as well as at the Justice Department. He is also
a former intelligence officer for the U.S. military and has been recently published on Presidential succession issues by the Federalist
Society.
Our final witness is Professor Howard Wasserman. Professor
Wasserman teaches law at Florida International University College
of Law and has studied and published on the subject of Presidential succession and the U.S. Constitution.
We look forward to hearing from all of you, and if you would give
us your testimony in that order, and after you have testified, we
will have perhaps other Senators here that would like to make
statements, and then we have got a series of very interesting questions we would like to propound to you.
Professor?
STATEMENT OF AKHIL AMAR, SOUTHMAYD PROFESSOR OF
LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, YALE LAW SCHOOL, NEW
HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

Mr. AMAR. Thank you, Mr. Chair. My name is Akhil Reed Amar.
I am the Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science at Yale
and have been writing about the topic of Presidential succession for
over a decade. In February 1994, I offered testimony on this topic
to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, and I
am grateful for the opportunity to appear here today. As my testi-
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7
mony draws upon several articles that I have written on the subject, I would respectfully request that these articles be made part
of the record.
The current Presidential succession Act, 3 U.S.C. section 19, is
in my view a disastrous statute, an accident waiting to happen. It
should be repealed and replaced. I will summarize its main problems and then outline my proposed alternative.
First, section 19 violates the Constitution’s Succession Clause,
Article II, section 1, paragraph 6, which authorizes Congress to
name an ‘‘officer’’ to act as President in the event that both President and Vice President are unavailable. House and Senate leaders
are not ‘‘officers’’ within the meaning of the Succession Clause.
Rather, the Framers clearly contemplated that a Cabinet officer
would be named as Acting President. This is not merely my personal reading of Article II. It is also James Madison’s view, which
he expressed forcefully while a Congressman in 1792.
Second, the act’s bumping provision, section 19(d)(2), constitutes
an independent violation of the succession clause, which says that
the ‘‘officer’’ named by Congress shall ‘‘act as President...until the
[Presidential or Vice Presidential] Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected.’’ section 19(d)(2) instead says, in effect,
that the successor officer shall act as President until someone else
wants the job. Bumping weakens the Presidency itself and increases instability and uncertainty at the very moment when the
Nation is most in need of tranquility. And I think that the scenario
that Senator Cornyn offered very vividly captured some of the
problems with instability and how it weakens the Presidency in a
variety of situations.
Now, even if I were wrong about these constitutional claims, they
are nevertheless substantial ones. The first point, to repeat, comes
directly from James Madison, father of the Constitution, who
helped draft the specific words of the Succession Clause. Over the
last decade, many citizens and scholars from across the ideological
spectrum have told me that they agree with Madison about the
constitutional questions involved. If, God forbid, America were ever
to lose both her President and Vice President, even temporarily,
the succession law in place should provide unquestioned legitimacy
to the ‘‘officer’’ who must then act as President—in part to keep it
out of the courts and to reassure the country. And, again, I think
the scenarios that Senator Cornyn offered were very vivid and, to
me, quite powerful. With so large a constitutional cloud hanging
over it, section 19 fails to provide this desired level of legitimacy.
In addition to these constitutional objections, there are many policy problems with section 19. First, section 19’s requirement that
an Acting President resign his previous post makes this law an
awkward instrument in situations of temporary disability. And,
Senator Lott, I think that is partly what you were talking about
with having to leave your House job and the instabilities that that
would create. The House needs to get new leadership and all of
that. section 19’s rules also run counter to the approach of the 25th
Amendment, Senator Lott, which you mentioned, which facilitates
smooth handoffs of power back and forth in situations of short-term
disability—scheduled surgery, for example.
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Second, section 19 creates a variety of perverse incentives and
conflicts of interest, warping the Congress’s proper role in impeachments and in confirmations of Vice Presidential nominees under
the 25th Amendment.
Third, section 19 can upend the results of a Presidential election.
If Americans elect party A to the White House, why should we end
up with party B? Here, too, section 19 is in serious tension with
the better approach embodied in the 25th Amendment, which enables a President to pick his successor and thereby promotes executive party continuity.
Fourth, section 19 provides no mechanism for addressing arguable Vice Presidential disabilities or for determining Presidential
disability in the event the Vice President is dead or disabled. These
are especially troubling omissions because of the indispensable role
that the Vice President needs to play under the 25th Amendment.
Fifth, section 19 fails to deal with certain windows of special vulnerability immediately before and after Presidential elections.
In short, section 19 violates Article II and is out of sync with the
basic spirit and structure of the 25th Amendment, which became
part of our Constitution two decades after section 19 was enacted.
The main argument against Cabinet succession is that Presidential powers should go to an elected leader, not an appointed underling. But the 25th Amendment offers an attractive alternative
model of handpicked succession: from Richard Nixon to Gerald
Ford to Nelson Rockefeller, for example, with a President naming
the person who will fill in for him and complete his term if he is
unable to do so himself. The 25th Amendment does not give a
President carte blanche; it provides for a special confirmation process to vet the President’s nominee, and confirmation in that special
process confers added legitimacy upon the nominee. And, Senator
Lott, it was very interesting to hear that even as a House Member,
you were involved in the confirmation process, which ordinarily
does not happen, but the 25th Amendment creates that special
level of participation and legitimacy.
So if the 25th Amendment reflects the best approach to sequential double vacancy—when the top two positions, President and
Vice President, become unavailable at slightly different times, first
one, then the other—a closely analogous approach should be used
in the event of simultaneous vacancy when they both become unavailable at the same instant. Congress could, if it wanted to, create a new Cabinet post—it could be called Assistant Vice President
or Second Vice President or First Secretary; the name is not particularly important. But this new position would be one that would
be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate in a
high-visibility process. This officer’s sole responsibilities would be
to receive regular briefings preparing him or her to serve at a moment’s notice, and to lie low until needed: in the line of succession
but out of the line of fire, perhaps out of this city altogether in a
location that would be very far removed from the President and
Vice President in general.
The democratic mandate of this Assistant Vice President or First
Secretary might be further enhanced if Presidential candidates announced their prospective nominees for this third-in-line job well
before the November election. In casting ballots for their preferred
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Presidential candidate, American voters would also be endorsing
that candidate’s announced succession team of Vice President and
third in line. Cabinet officers should follow the Assistant Vice
President in the longer line of succession, as is true in the current
statute.
This solution solves the constitutional problems I identified. The
new Assistant Vice President would clearly be an ‘‘officer’’; bumping would be eliminated. The solution also solves the practical
problems. No resignations would be required; power could flow
smoothly back and forth in situations of temporary disability. Congressional conflicts of interest would be avoided. Party and policy
continuity within the executive branch would be preserved. And
the process by which the American electorate and then the Senate
endorsed any individual Assistant Vice President would confer the
desired democratic legitimacy on this officer, bolstering his or her
mandate to lead in a crisis.
The two additional issues I have raised today—Vice Presidential
disability and windows of special vulnerability at election time—
also have clean solutions, as explained in my 1994 testimony.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Amar appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman LOTT. Thank you.
Mr. Fortier?
STATEMENT OF JOHN C. FORTIER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, AND RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. FORTIER. I would like to thank the Rules and Judiciary Committees for holding this hearing on the important subject of Presidential succession.
Let me salute the Senate for already having begun this task.
Senator Lott mentioned this morning S. 148, Senator DeWine’s bill,
which passed through the Rules Committee and the full Senate. I
support the substance of the bill, putting the Secretary of Homeland Security in the line of succession, but also applaud the thinking behind it. Typically, when a new Cabinet position, we just lump
them at the end of the line of succession without thinking about
their relative importance. In this case, we did think about it, and
we moved the Cabinet Secretary up to a place below the big four
Cabinet members, but thinking about his relative importance with
national security matters.
If you use this as a model to think through and not follow simply
the status quo of the current Presidential succession Act, I think
we will be moving in the right direction.
In my written testimony, I provide a number of areas that need
improvement, but let me highlight three this morning.
First, everyone in the line of succession lives and works in the
Washington, D.C., area. In the nightmare scenario of terrorists detonating a nuclear device, it is possible that everyone in the line of
succession might be killed. Imagine the aftermath: a parade of generals, Governors, and Under Secretaries claiming to be in charge.
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To fix this problem, I have a solution which is similar in some
ways to the one that Professor Amar presented, but I suggest that
we create four or five offices that would be lower down the line of
succession that would be held by people outside of Washington. In
particular, we can imagine that a President would nominate sitting
Governors, if the State Constitution of that State did not forbid
them to hold Federal office, which some States do and some States
don’t; or former public figures at a high level—former Presidents,
former Vice Presidents, Cabinet members, or Members of Congress.
These offices could be, through a regular nomination and confirmation process, put in place. We would ask them to generally stay
outside of Washington, receive regular security briefings, and the
office could be structured with some additional duties, such as regional coordination of homeland security issues. My proposal is to
put them in the middle of the Cabinet, somewhere below the top
five officers. They would serve as an ultimate backstop if the worst
were to happen.
Second, consider the role of congressional leaders in the line of
succession. I think it is fair to say that the dominant view of constitutional scholars is that it is unconstitutional to have Members
of Congress in the line of succession, although, of course, practice
has gone in the other direction for many years.
I share this view that at least the Framers did not intend to put
Members in the line of succession, but in my testimony, I try to
walk through the various scenarios that Congress might be called
on to succeed to the Presidency congressional leaders and identify
which of them makes sense for us and which of them don’t. And
if you come to the same conclusions that I do, you will find at least
a way of reducing the role of Congress in the line of succession.
For example, Congress could potentially—or a Member of Congress could come to the Presidency based on the death, the incapacity, the resignation, the removal, or the failure to qualify of the
President. And to take the incapacity issue, for example, do we
want a Speaker of the House taking over temporarily for a President? It could be a Speaker of the House of the other party. It
would be a case where the Speaker would have to resign his or her
seat in Congress and as Speaker. If you have a scenario of a President who is fading in and out of capacity, has a condition that
comes back into health, then displaces the Speaker of the House,
potentially another Speaker of the House, newly elected, would
then have to take over. It makes little sense for an incapacitation
scenario to involve Congress. And several of the other scenarios I
also find problematic.
The one case where I would recommend keeping Congress in the
line—and I think this is consistent with the Constitution because
it comes from a different provision in the 20th Amendment—is that
of the failure to qualify of a President. In the case where an election controversy goes all the way up to January 20th and we have
no President, or in the case of an attack that occurs shortly before
the inauguration, there is no Cabinet from the incoming administration, and the only other option we would have would be to go
back to the Cabinet of the prior administration.
Third, think of individual scenarios, and in particular, the inauguration scenario, which I referred to. This is perhaps the most
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vulnerable time for Government when all of the people at the top
of the line of succession gather together for a ceremony, and yet
none of the people in the line of succession, the Cabinet members
for the new administration, have been nominated. Consider for a
moment what would happen if terrorists had set off a bomb during
the inaugural ceremony. The President-elect, the Vice Presidentelect, Speaker, and pro tem are likely there and would have perished along with many Members of Congress and the Supreme
Court. Who would succeed to the Presidency? Well, the Cabinet,
but the Cabinet of the prior administration. Imagine such an attack had occurred in 2001. A country expecting Republican George
W. Bush to take office would have found themselves with a Democratic President Larry Summers. As Secretary of the Treasury,
Summers was the highest ranking Clinton Cabinet member eligible
to serve as President.
But the scenario is actually even more complicated than that, as
many Cabinet Secretaries typically resign before the inauguration,
leaving Acting Secretaries in their place. And an Acting Secretary
is in the line of succession as long as that person has been confirmed by the Senate for some position. So if it is a political appointee, a number 2 or a number 3 person at the State Department, that person will take over as Acting Secretary of State and
be in the line as well.
I have a piece coming out entitled ‘‘President Michael Armacost?’’
who, if you know, the president of Brookings could have been the
President of the United States in the scenario of the 1989 inaugural.
One of the difficulties here is that there is a gap between when
the President can take office and can nominate his Cabinet and the
Senate can come in to confirm them. At times, in cases of quick action, there is a gap of only 3 or 4 hours. But it has been up to 5
days in the case of 1989. And there are several changes in custom
and law that would protect us from this scenario.
First would be to establish a custom of the outgoing President to
nominate the new Cabinet coming in on the morning of January
20th. The Senate could come in, confirm the Cabinet before noon
of January 20th, and you would have people in place in case the
worst happened, and those people would not have to attend the inaugural scenario.
Second, the question of whether an Acting Secretary should be
in the line of succession. I recommend that we take out that provision and just rely on those who were confirmed for the Cabinet post
themselves.
And, finally, there are significant problems with the continuity of
Congress itself in the case of an inaugural attack. Congress may
have its own difficulties reconstituting itself and to the extent that
we can address them, we come up with a more reasonable congressional leader coming out of a newly re-established Congress that
might eventually take over.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fortier appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman LOTT. Thank you.
Mr. Baker?
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STATEMENT OF M. MILLER BAKER, ESQ., MCDERMOTT WILL &
EMERY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, and Members of
the Committees, thank you for the invitation to be here today to
discuss issues pertaining to Presidential succession.
This issue, which has surfaced as a political and constitutional
issue every several decades in American history, as Senator Lott
noted, is of particular concern in the aftermath of September the
11th. It is very clear, for all the horror of that terrible day, it easily
could have been even worse. It is apparent that had our enemies
planned and executed a strike like September 11th for the principal purpose of decapitating the Government of the United
States—and, in particular, the Presidency—that they very well
might have succeeded.
Chairman LOTT. Mr. Baker, pull that microphone just a little bit
closer, if you would, please.
Mr. BAKER. Certainly.
Chairman LOTT. Thank you.
Mr. BAKER. Any attempt by America’s enemies to decapitate the
U.S. Government unfortunately would be assisted, rather than
thwarted, by the Presidential Succession Act of 1947. In my view,
the 1947 Act is the single most poorly designed statute in the entire United States Code. I say this because the 1947 Act could deprive the Nation at the worst possible moment of what Alexander
Hamilton in the Federalist No. 70 called ‘‘energy in the executive,’’
with truly catastrophic consequences.
My written statement describes in detail my criticisms of the
1947 Act. I will briefly summarize my views here.
First, the 1947 Act gives the House Speaker and the President
pro tem a special preference in the line of succession that enables
them to bump or to displace a Cabinet officer serving as Acting
President, even if the House Speaker doing the bumping was chosen only by a handful of Representatives in the aftermath of an attack that left most Members of the House dead.
Even if the Speaker and the President pro tem are to remain in
the line of succession—and I do not believe that they should—this
special privilege of bumping by a new Speaker or a President pro
tem by one that chose not to assume the Acting Presidency when
it became available should be eliminated from the law.
Second, the 1947 Act requires that a statutory successor resign
his or her post as a condition of assuming the Acting Presidency
even if the period of serving in this capacity is only for a few hours.
This requirement could easily induce hesitation, especially if the
fate of the President and the Vice President was unknown. This inducement to hesitation should be removed from the law. The law
should induce action, not inaction. We need energy in the executive.
Third, the 1947 Act does not allow a more senior Cabinet successor that was temporarily unable to act to assume the Acting
Presidency from a more junior Cabinet officer that assumed the
Acting Presidency. This induces hesitation because a lower-ranking
Cabinet officer may be fearful of being charged with usurpation.
For example, on September the 11th, when Colin Powell was out
of the country, if the President, Vice President, Speaker, and Presi-
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dent pro tem had been killed or were missing in attacks on the
White House and the Capitol building, then-Treasury Secretary
Paul O’Neill would have had to have made an immediate decision
about whether Colin Powell was unable to discharge Presidential
duties because of his absence from the country. The military may
have been on the phone requesting authority to shoot down airliners. In the meantime, the Treasury Secretary is trying to decide
whether or not he has authority to become Acting President. In the
meantime, the decision has to be made.
Under section 19, had O’Neill assumed Presidential duties, Powell would not have been able to displace O’Neill upon his return to
Washington, which might have resulted in claims that O’Neill had
wrongfully usurped the Presidency and in litigation over whether
Powell, in fact, had been unable to discharge Presidential duties at
the time of O’Neill’s assumption of the Acting Presidency. The very
fact that O’Neill might be exposed to charges of usurpation might
cause him to hesitate before acting. A Cabinet officer in O’Neill’s
position on September the 11th would probably remember the ridicule that Alexander Haig suffered in 1981 from declaring that he
was in charge pending the Vice President’s return to Washington
and doubtless would like to avoid a similar fate.
Fourth, I recommend that the Congress remove the Speaker, the
President pro tem, and all the Cabinet officers from the line of succession save the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary
of Homeland Security. As has been noted before, placing the congressional leaders in the line of succession allows for the possibility
of undoing the results of the last Presidential election. In addition,
does anyone seriously believe, with all due respect to the incumbents of these offices, that the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of Veterans Affairs should be catapulted into the Presidency,
especially in the heat of a supreme crisis that could compare to December 7, 1941, and November 22, 1963, rolled into one?
Fifth, Congress should create special successor officers comprised
of State Governors and others that the President would appoint by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate or, as Professor
Amar has suggested, possibly with the House involved as well.
Sixth, I believe Congress should submit a constitutional amendment to the States for ratification to cure the various deficiencies
in the Presidential succession mechanism that cannot be corrected
by statute and to validate other provisions in the succession law
that may be unconstitutional.
Since it is clear that a constitutional amendment is necessary to
ensure the continuity of Congress, the same amendment should
also address issues of Presidential succession. By way of example
of an issue that probably needs to be addressed by this amendment, it is unclear under existing law whether when the Acting
President should nominate a Vice President under the 25th
Amendment, when the new Vice President is confirmed by Congress, does the new Vice President then bump the Acting President
who made the nomination of the Vice President under the 25th
Amendment? That needs to be clarified by existing law, and that
can probably only be clarified by a constitutional amendment.
Thank you very much.
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[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman LOTT. Thank you.
Mr. Wasserman?
STATEMENT OF HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW, MIAMI, FLORIDA

Mr. WASSERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members,
members of the Committee, my name is Howard Wasserman. I am
Assistant Professor of Law at Florida International University College of Law.
My testimony this morning draws on a couple of articles that I
have written on this subject. I ask unanimous consent that they be
included in the record.
Chairman LOTT. Without objection, they will be included in the
record at this point.
Mr. WASSERMAN. The consensus from the members of the Committee and the panelists that we have heard so far this morning
seems to agree on two points: section 19 has serious, multiple flaws
and has been flawed from the beginning, and that the events of
September 11, 2001, drew those flaws into very specific relief. And
I want to focus on a couple of areas from my submitted testimony
as to those flaws.
First, I agree that Cabinet officers are and should be the primary
and preferred statutory successors as a matter of partisan continuity, as a matter of democratic legitimacy, and as a matter of
separation of powers. I also agree that we need to extend the line
of succession by expanding the Cabinet, particularly by creating a
single position—Assistant Vice President, First Secretary, Successor Secretary—whose sole job would be to sit as first in line of
succession and to remain outside of Washington.
I believe, however, that the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate can and should remain in the line
of succession as eligible successors, but at the end of the line, for
this reason: September 11th raises the possibility of the worst-case
scenario of the death or disability of the President, Vice President,
and everybody we can imagine putting in the Cabinet, including a
First Secretary or a panel of First Secretaries.
Now, our discussion of Presidential succession this morning is occurring in the context of a broader conversation about continuity
in the Federal Government as a whole, including what steps can
be taken to ensure that there always is a functioning Congress. If
there is a functioning Congress, whether because Congress survived the terrorist attack intact or because Congress has somehow
been reconstituted, under Article I the first and necessary step in
each House will be to pick a Speaker and a President pro tem, respectively. Those two offices always will be filled, and if they always are filled and if those officers remain in the line of succession,
then we have someplace for the executive power to devolve in that
worst-case scenario. And I would suggest, in fact, that keeping
them in the line is necessary because in their absence in the worstcase scenario, there is no one under the Constitution or statute
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who would be able to assume the Executive power short of holding
a new election.
Second, the other major change that needs to be made to section
19, in addition to reordering the line of succession, is to provide for
special expedited elections whenever section 19 has been triggered
by a permanent double vacancy. Now, the original 1792 statute
provided for expedited elections. That provision has not been included in either of the two subsequent enactments.
Now, I agree that what we could call indirect or what Professor
Amar has called ‘‘apostolic democratic legitimacy’’ attaches to an
Acting President who had been a member of the Cabinet, who had
been the hand-picked policy surrogate of the populist President.
But I would suggest that that indirect democratic legitimate legitimacy only lasts for a short period of time. It lasts long enough to
restore order, to calm the public, and to begin the recovery process.
It does not for 3 years and 4 months, which is how long an Acting
President, whether it had been Speaker Hastert, Secretary Powell,
Secretary O’Neill, would have held the executive power had the
tragedy of September 11th included the deaths of the President
and Vice President.
This special election reasonably can occur within approximately
6 months. That is enough time to allow for national mourning, to
allow the restoration of some public stability, and to allow the
States to organize 51 simultaneous popular elections. And the election would bestow direct popular legitimacy on the occupant of the
White House via deliberative selection by the national electoral
constituency. Finally, and most importantly, that special election
enables the Nation truly to move forward in the longer term behind
a nationally popularly chosen President and Vice President.
I thank the Committee for the opportunity to address this joint
hearing, and I wish this body every success in drawing the most
workable and most structurally consistent Presidential succession
process.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wasserman appears as a submission for the record.]
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Professor Wasserman.
Before we begin our questions, Senator Feingold has returned. If
you would like to make a statement at this time, we would be glad
to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
Chairman Cornyn as well, for holding this important hearing.
The topic of Presidential succession has occupied the Congress
periodically since our Nation’s founding. Usually a revival in interest in the topic occurs because of some event that leads us to dust
off the statute and the Constitution and contemplate, ‘‘What if?’’
That happened when Andrew Johnson succeeded to the Presidency
upon the assassination of Abraham Lincoln and then was impeached by the House of Representatives.
It happened again when Harry Truman became President after
the death of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He viewed the statutory
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solution reached in 1886 as unsatisfactory and convinced Congress
to pass a new succession statute.
The assassination of President Kennedy led to the adoption of
the 25th Amendment as the country contemplated how a Vice
President who becomes President should be replaced and what
should happen if the President become disabled.
Now, as the witnesses have already indicated, of course, September 11th has revived interest in Presidential succession. The
possibility of a terrorist attack that takes the life of both the President and the Vice President—[microphone out]—contemplate. But
we have a duty to at least examine the question of whether the
Constitution and the U.S. Code are adequate to preserve the Union
and provide the country with the best possible leadership in such
a crisis.
The issues raised by this topic are certainly interesting for anyone interested in our system of Government and our Constitution,
and I have already enjoyed hearing from our witnesses about them.
Should leaders of the legislative branch be in the line of succession? If so, how? And which leaders? Should the succession be different in the case of death as opposed to disability of the President,
Vice President, and others in the line of succession? And if so, how
should we provide for a person higher up the chain to move into
the office when they are able to do so?
These are all questions worth exploring. I do not believe, however, and I know the Chairmen do not believe that we should obsess about them. Our most dedicated efforts should be devoted to
preventing the next terrorist attack and making sure our first responders are prepared to deal with it if it happen. This is not to
say that this hearing should not have been held, but only to caution that the time and resources of this Congress and this Government are finite, and we must not be distracted from the task at
hand by too much attention to what will most likely be only theoretical questions. But I do think this is extremely interesting for
any of us that have spent time in our lives looking at Government,
and I thank again Chairman Lott and Chairman Cornyn for the
opportunity to speak, and I look forward to the further testimony
of our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Senator Feingold, for your interest
in this issue and other related issues and your desire to see that
we consider reforms in a variety of areas to try to make the Congress and the Government more efficient, and we appreciate your
leadership.
Let me go back then and get into some questions. Since you have
testified first, we will come back to you, Professor Amar. Why did
Truman more or less insist that leaders of Congress be included in
the line of succession? If you look back at the history of that, that
had been debated. Madison, as you all referred to, did not think
leaders of Congress should be included, and then I guess there was
another action taken in 1886 and then finally in 1946 or 1947
when the last legislation was passed. But the history seems to indicate that Truman really was advocating that Members of Congress
be included. Was this just a way of currying favor? Or was there
some basis for it? Because it does not make sense to me.
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Mr. AMAR. President Truman was a great man. He was not burdened with an extensive legal education. He actually had gone to
law school but—and he did not present himself as a constitutional
expert. He came from this body, and that was his biography, and
I think he had real skepticism about the idea of someone unelected
assuming the position. He had a certain phrase about people in the
State Department, actually, that appears in McCullough’s biography: ‘‘the striped pants boys.’’ So he had a certain skepticism
about people who had never run for anything in their life.
His proposal actually was not quite the same one that Congress
adopted in 1947. For example, he wanted there to be a special election in the event of a successor Presidency that the bill that Congress passed did not include that provision, and he signed it anyway. So the stakes were lower, of course, if it is just a brief period.
I think that the 25th Amendment addresses some—that model
addresses some of President Truman’s concerns by creating a sort
of special legitimacy through a special confirmation process. And if
we created a new Cabinet position at the top whose only purpose
was really to be next in line, it could even be someone who had
been President in the past or a former office holder the country had
a great degree of confidence in. Then if candidates announced their
prospective nominees to the American people before the November
election, there would be a kind of national endorsement of that
next-in-line position, which I think would satisfy Truman himself.
Truman himself, of course, no one quite directly voted for him as
Vice President, but when they voted for President Roosevelt, they
voted for him as well. And so, too, I think an idea might be, well,
if you vote for the candidate, you are voting for his Vice President,
and also the third-in- line person that he has designated, and that
would create a little bit more electoral responsibility.
A final point is he is, of course, thinking about all of this before
there has been a President Ford, before there has been a Vice
President Rockefeller under the 25th Amendment process, which is
sort of a different one than the one he is imagining.
Chairman LOTT. Frankly, I am surprised that at least a couple
of you, maybe three of you, have advocated an Assistant Vice President. I know some people who have in the past questioned the
value of the current Vice Presidency, although I think over the
years that position has grown in responsibility and visibility, too.
But I don’t know. An Assistant Vice President just seems like we
are adding even more—I do not know—encumbrances in a way. I
mean, why would you want to go off on a wing that way when you
have got an order of succession that you could go with? So I would
be interested if any of you want to defend that a little bit.
And the second thing is, though—because we are beginning to
run out of time, and I will yield to the others for questions—can
we do what we need to do in this area just with a statute? Or do
you think we need a constitutional amendment?
Mr. AMAR. I think for congressional continuity, there may be constitutional amendment needs, but for this I think a statute could
be pretty cleanly adopted. You do not have to go for the First Secretary idea. I think the biggest thing that all of us have suggested
is to seriously rethink the legislative leaders at the top of the suc-
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cession list if that does not work in a variety of ways, constitutional
and policy.
The reason for the new office, there are about three or four
thoughts: It enables you to have someone who is out of Washington, D.C., because he does not have a regular day job, which ordinarily you might think, well, why create another make-work job?
But if you are concerned about these absolute worst-case, what-if
scenarios, the fact that he or she is out of the line of fire is an affirmative advantage.
Chairman LOTT. I wonder if it isn’t a simpler solution just to say
that one of Cabinet Secretaries—frankly, maybe a lot of the Cabinet Secretaries—could be out of this city. I never have quite understood why the Secretary of Agriculture shouldn’t be in St. Louis or
Kansas City or whoever wants it.
Mr. AMAR. You could. A second thought is that the person who
might be even the best Secretary of State might not necessarily be
the best person in this very unusual double-death, double-disability
situation. Maybe you want to just pick—I am a baseball purist. I
do not much like the DH. But you might want to, you know, pick
someone—maybe they are not a great fielder, but they are good at
one very discrete function. They are great hitters. So one function,
someone who in an absolute crisis would be the person that the
American people have the most sense of comfort with, maybe even,
again, someone who has held the position in the past.
Chairman LOTT. OK. Mr. Baker, I think I see you squirming like
you would like to get into this discussion. Do you want to respond
briefly to any of those questions I propounded? Then I will yield to
Senator Cornyn.
Mr. BAKER. Thank you, Senator. I would say that a statute could
solve most of these problems, but not all of them. And the one example I gave in my testimony was this uncertainty under the 15th
Amendment. We have an Acting President, let’s say a Cabinet officer or a Speaker who is serving as Acting President. One of their
first duties under the 25th Amendment is to nominate a Vice President.
Now, under the 25th Amendment, a Vice President becomes
President if there is no President. And when we have an Acting
President, we do not have a President. We have an Acting President. That is a distinction with a difference. There are different
views on this, but I think it is a close call. And certainly it is rife
with uncertainty. So I think there are some issues that need to be
addressed by an amendment.
In terms of having First Assistant Vice Presidents outside of
Washington, one way to deal with this might be without establishing a formal office—but it would probably take an amendment
to do this—is to allow the President to nominate, have the Senate
confirm former prominent office holders that we would all have
confidence in their ability to perform this function. Former President Bush, for example, could serve in the line of succession. One
might imagine a Democratic President nominating former Vice
President Gore or former Vice President Mondale. They would not
have to receive any pay per se. They would not have to have an
office. But in order to do that constitutionally, I think that it would
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be probably necessary, if you are not going to create an office, to
have a constitutional amendment to validate that process.
But there are ways of doing it, of creating successors outside of
the Cabinet who are not going to hold an office per se. Of course,
holding an office per se is, I think, actually a good idea, but you
don’t necessarily have to do that.
In sum, most of the problems can be addressed by amendments
to the statute, but I think there are a few issues that have to be
addressed by a constitutional amendment.
Chairman LOTT. Senator Cornyn?
Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much, Chairman Lott.
Gentlemen, we hear whenever constitutional amendments are
proposed or even discussed in the Constitution Subcommittee, for
example, or on the Judiciary Committee, about the reluctance that
most people feel when it comes to amending the Constitution, although we have done it 27 times. And hopefully when it is necessary to do so, we will not show any hesitancy at discharging the
duty that we have assumed as a Member of Congress when it
comes to recommending those amendments that are necessary.
But besides the constitutional issues that have been raised about
Members of Congress serving in the line of succession, I wonder if
you might have some comments, and I will start with Dr. Fortier—
am I pronouncing that correctly?—first.
But, for example, I am aware of the problems that occurred during the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson when the
President pro tem, anticipating his Senate colleagues would vote to
remove Johnson and install him in the White House, actually announced Cabinet appointments that he would make were he made
President, thus, in essence, building a constituency, I guess, for
that choice.
I am also aware of problems that occurred during the Vice Presidential confirmation proceedings of Gerald Ford when some tried
to delay confirmation so that House Speaker Carl Albert would become President in the event Congress forced President Nixon to resign from office.
So do you see, in addition to constitutional issues, prudential
concerns that would call for a constitutional amendment? Or do
you think a statute would solve this? Please address that.
Mr. FORTIER. I think most of the problems can be dealt with by
statute. I agree with Professor Amar on the continuity of Congress
issue, which we were pleased that you held a hearing on last week,
that involves more of a constitutional solution. Most can be dealt
with by statute.
If we were redrafting the 25th Amendment, if we were at the
stage where we had not put that in place, we might do it differently. The initial draft of the 25th Amendment which came before the Senate Judiciary Committee, while President Johnson was
President, without a Vice President, took Congress out of the line
of succession and made it clear that the Cabinet would step in for
an incapacitated President in the same way that the Vice President
is empowered to do so in the current Act. That was ultimately
taken out because of some concerns of offending the Speaker at the
time, John McCormack, and once it was enacted and ratified, it
was done without that.
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So at that stage in time, I think we could clarify that and would
go with the original version. But there are enough things that we
can do in law to even specify in a little bit more detail what the
procedure would be for a Cabinet member taking over in an incapacitation situation.
You also mentioned the case of impeachment. I think it is worthwhile looking at each scenario that Congress is in the line of succession, and the impeachment and removal scenario is one where
Congress has a real conflict of interest because it not only has to
choose to remove the President, but it would put one of its own in
place, and theoretically a party switch. You mentioned the two
cases where we came very close to that.
Senator CORNYN. One other question I had was about other reforms over and above those that you have discussed in your prepared statements, each one of you here. I wonder if, as long as we
are looking at trying to address these issues, whether we should
look at these as well.
For example, I understand that the 25th Amendment addresses
uncertainties in Presidential disability by allowing the Vice President and other officers to certify that the President is disabled. But
the 25th Amendment does not address uncertainties in Vice Presidential disability. What happens if both the President and the Vice
President are disabled? Do we need a statute to provide some objective standard, if that is possible, for determining a Vice Presidential disability? Or can we assume that if both the Vice President and the President are not well enough to assert their claims
to the Presidency, the office will just automatically devolve on
someone else according to the statute?
I wonder if we could perhaps—Professor Wasserman, do you
have any thoughts in that regard?
Mr. WASSERMAN. My initial thought is that we at some level
need some objective standards as to both the President controlled
by—the 25th Amendment does not establish the standards for
President—for determining the Presidential—when the President is
disabled. But as to both, if both offices—or if there is a disability
in both offices, then by the terms of section 19, it would just devolve. It would just devolved down. Again, the reason for the import of moving Cabinet officers up to the top to keep all that movement, because the disability could be temporary, to keep any movement within the executive branch and not bringing Members of
Congress into the mix.
Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of other areas of interest, as I know all of us do, and I know we will be able to submit
any questions we have in writing as well as follow up. But at this
time I would yield.
Thank you very much.
Chairman LOTT. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.
I believe—is it ‘‘For-teer’’ or ‘‘For-ti-ay’’?
Mr. FORTIER. Well, you have raised a family dispute, but I say
‘‘For-ti-ay.’’
[Laughter.]
Chairman LOTT. If it is in Louisiana and the Mississippi Gulf
Coast, it is ‘‘For-ti-ay.’’ If it is here, I thought it was ‘‘For-teer.’’
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Mr. FORTIER. Well, for some reason, my Northeast family has
picked up your Mississippi tradition of ‘‘For-ti-ay.’’
Chairman LOTT. All right. Well—
Mr. AMAR. It is ‘‘For-ti-air’’ in Connecticut.
[Laughter.]
Chairman LOTT. You say you think it is unconstitutional to have
congressional leaders in the line of succession, I believe, in your
testimony. Why? I believe that point was made by Senator Cornyn,
but I want to get a clarification on that. And then, Senator Feingold, if you want to pick up with some questions after that?
Mr. FORTIER. I think there is a not universal but dominant position among constitutional scholars that it is for two reasons.
One, the word ‘‘officer’’ that appears in Article II, Members of
Congress are not officers of the United States, and if you look at
the Framers, they intended there to be officers of the United States
in the line.
Second, the larger structural argument about separation of powers, that the Framers probably did not intend that.
My recommendation actually is to think through the policy consequences of each of the scenarios rather than simply rely on that.
And I have one exception to that, and that, I mentioned earlier, is
the case where a President fails to qualify. You have, as I say, an
election controversy which is not resolved before January 20th. In
1876, we went up to just a couple of days before the March inauguration without a President. Or you have some sort of catastrophic attack where both the President and Vice President are
killed just before the inauguration.
That scenario is guided by the 20th Amendment, and that language is different. It does not require an officer. It just refers to
Congress being able to put the person that they choose in the line.
So that narrow case, I think, is not unconstitutional, but I would
recommend you look at the policy consequences of each of the various scenarios that Congress would come into the line.
Chairman LOTT. Senator Dodd has joined us. Senator Dodd, if
you would like to make a statement at this time and then pick up
on the questioning, we would be glad to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

Senator DODD. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairmen, both
of our Chairs, and I apologize for arriving a few minutes late here
this morning, but let me thank our witnesses as well for their
statements and their views on this important subject. And I thank
both of our Chairs here and commend you both for calling this joint
hearing. This is not a common experience, but I think it is a worthwhile one, when we are addressing an issue of this significance and
importance. And, certainly, the events of 9/11 were a not so subtle
reminder of the potential scenarios that could call into question, obviously, the procedures for establishing Presidential succession.
And so I think this is a very timely and important subject matter.
This is exactly the environment under which we ought to be considering those questions before a national catastrophe occurs and we
are forced to act in haste or in response to a constitutional crisis.
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As I know you have all heard, and those who have followed this
subject matter know, Article II, section 1, obviously, of the Constitution and subsequent amendments establishes the foundation
for Presidential succession, makes clear that the Framers’ preference that the Vice President should succeed to a vacancy in the
Presidency. In their wisdom, the Framers left to Congress the question of how to settle a double vacancy, as occurs if the Presidency
and the Vice Presidency are both left vacant. The Congress did not
hesitate to fill this void and passed the first Presidential Succession Act in 1792, as you all know.
It is noteworthy that in the 211-year history since that Act was
adopted, Congress has only twice substantively or substantially revised it, which is rather unique considering how Congress usually
likes to act in these matters, in both cases in response to circumstances related to the death of a sitting President. The history
of the Succession Act and its progeny is a reflection, I think, of the
200-plus-year debate on the subject and the dilemma Congress
faces when it considers a change only in response to a crisis. This
history is also revealing in its consideration of the same issues that
our witnesses have
raised here today. And if we are to avoid the mistakes of the
past, then we only need to look at our own history.
The 1792 Act provided that in the case of a double vacancy, the
order of succession would fall to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and then the Speaker of the House. But the term of either
of those legislative officers was to be temporary only since the Act
provided for a special election to fill the Presidential vacancy, unless the vacancy occurred in the last full year of the term.
The placement of the legislative officers in the line of succession
was not universally supported, as historians will note, and its critics included such constitutional authorities as James Madison. Representative Jonathan Sturgis of Connecticut observed at the time
that if the Speaker were in the line of succession, there would be—
and I am quoting him—‘‘cabling and electioneering’’ in the choice
of Speaker. However, the Act remained substantially unchanged for
nearly a hundred years.
The Succession Act of 1886 followed the assassination of President James Garfield in 1881 and his incapacitation for a period of
almost 80 days, and the untimely death of Vice President Thomas
Andrews Hendricks in 1885, less than 9 months after his inauguration. Ironically, in both circumstances, both the office of the President pro tempore, then third in line to the Presidency, and the office of the Speaker, then fourth in line, were vacant at the time.
Similarly, in both cases, there was a potential that least the position of the President pro tempore of the Senate would be filled by
a member of the opposing party, thereby potentially leading to a
switch in party should a double vacancy arise.
To ensure the line of succession reduced the risk that such succession would result in a change in party in the White House, Congress passed the Succession Act of 1886, which eliminated the
President pro tempore and the Speaker from the line of succession
and provided for succession through Cabinet officers. The 1886 Act
also eliminated the requirement for a special election that had governed succession for more than 60 years.
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It was yet another death of a sitting President, that of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt in April 1945, less than 3 months into his fourth
term, and the ascendancy of the Presidency of Harry Truman that
precipitated the latest revisions in Presidential succession, the Succession Act of 1947. President Truman found himself ill-prepared
for the vacancy he filled, noting in his memoirs that, ‘‘Under the
present system, a Vice President cannot equip himself to become
President merely by virtue of being second in rank. The voters
should select him as a spare Chief Executive.’’
With the ensuing vacancy in the Vice Presidency, Truman was
called upon to nominate his successor, a task he did not relish. In
his special message to Congress on June 19, 1945, President Truman declared that he did not believe that in a democracy this
power should rest with the Chief Executive. He recommended that
Congress restore an elected officer to the line of succession, in this
case the Speaker, whom Truman argued had a more recent mandate, having been elected every 2 years, as opposed to 6 in the case
of the President pro tempore of the Senate. Truman also recommended that the requirement for a special election be restored.
In response, Congress enacted the Succession Act, which provides
for the Presidential succession in the case of a double vacancy, but
does not require that a special election be held.
Many issues that faced the 2nd Congress in 1792 and the 49th
Congress in 1886 and the 80th Congress in 1947 are before us
again here today. But today, while it is both fortunate and opportune that Congress is not faced with an immediate crisis, we are
faced with one of even greater magnitude than the one imagined
by previous Congresses: the potential elimination of the entire line
of succession by one terrorist act.
It is prudent that we act now to remove any constitutional questions or deficiencies in the Presidential succession procedures. The
principles that must guide our deliberations, in my view, are the
need to establish certainty, clarity, and the constitutionality of succession. The legitimacy of our democracy hangs obviously in the
balance of what we do, and nowhere is the need for a nonpartisan/
bipartisan approach more imperative than here.
So, again, I look forward to the testimony that you have already
given, and thank you again for being here.
Let me ask all of you to sort of comment on the Truman commentary that he made in his speech to Congress in 1945. Did
Harry Truman have it right in your views? Or did the Congress
have it right based on the actions that the Congress took subsequent to his recommendations? Begin where you would like to
begin. Who would like to start?
Mr. AMAR. Well, Chairman Lott asked about President Truman,
and I did endorse, in response to Chairman Lott’s question, the
idea, which some other witnesses have, a special election might be
a very good idea, and Truman proposed it, and Congress did not
adopt that. And Truman might have been right on that.
Let me mention one other decision that Congress made, a subsequent Congress. The Congress that proposed the 25th Amendment
after the assassination of President Kennedy, in effect, repudiated
the basic premise under which Truman operated. It basically said
that a President, in effect, should pick his successor as long as that
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successor is validated by a special kind of democratic confirmation
process. That is what the 25th Amendment does. It provides for an
unelected President, someone who was not even on the Presidential
ticket. It provides for President Gerald Ford. It provides for Vice
President, could be President, Nelson Rockefeller. So that is a determination that Congress made after 1945, after 1947, that I
think really undercuts in some ways Truman’s vision. And if we
wanted to rethink it now, we need to think about the 25th America, and as John has mentioned, the 20th Amendment as well, in
terms of coming up with a statute that fits our modern constitutional sensibilities.
Let me mention one other amendment, which is the lame-duck
amendment, the 22nd Amendment, which enables Congress to
meet before the Presidential inauguration and creates the possibility of the outgoing President, in effect, nominating the incoming
President’s Cabinet and having all of that confirmed before Inauguration Day as a matter of transition courtesy, which would solve
another special window of vulnerability that John has mentioned
that I have previously testified on in 1994.
Senator DODD. John?
Mr. FORTIER. I, too, share some concerns with the larger tack
that President Truman took about putting Congress in the line of
succession. His concern was that we should have an elected person
in the line. My concerns are partly constitutional, but mostly I
think that in many cases it is bad policy to have congressional
leaders in the line.
Senator DODD. The Speaker does not have to be elected either.
Mr. FORTIER. The Speaker does not have to be elected. That is
true, although we have never had that scenario. But there are difficult separation-of-powers questions which force the Speaker or
the pro tem or whoever takes office to more or less resign their office, even in a temporary situation. That is just one example of why
having Congress in the line does not lead to the sort of stability
that we would hope for in a case—it could be a case of a horrific
attack where there are numbers of Members, people in the line of
succession, dead or incapacitated, and forcing multiple Presidents
or the Speaker to take over for a short period of time, only to then
be displaced, and potentially another Speaker then later to take
the Presidency would lead to the sort of confusion that we do not
want to see after an attack.
Chairman LOTT. Senator Dodd, could I ask a question there?
Senator DODD. Sure.
Chairman LOTT. I wondered why they switched from the President pro tem being third to fourth. Was it just purely simply the
argument that President Truman made that he wanted the one
most recently who had faced election? Was that the only justification for it? Was there more to it than that?
Mr. FORTIER. The original Act had the pro tem, as you mentioned, and that was in the 2nd Congress. And the relative importance of the two offices, I think, was not as established. In fact, the
tradition that we now have of electing the longest-serving member
of the majority party the pro tem was not in place then. Truman
made the point that the Speaker of the House was mostly truly
representative of the American people in that he had been or she
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had been elected to a district and then elected by a majority of the
body.
Chairman LOTT. And the President pro tem position evolved into
what it now is, which is that he is or she is the longest-serving
Member of the Senate of the majority party. Earlier it had been
based on something other than just longevity, right?
Mr. AMAR. And the speaker ship also suggests an inattention,
putting that first in line, to some of the practical considerations
that my friend John has really highlighted. If we look at American
history, we are struck by the fact that for much of it, there is no
Speaker of the House because the House is not a continuing body
the way this body is. And so in 1857 and then again in 1859, there
is not a Speaker for 11 months out of the 24-month cycle. So that
is really not what you want if you focus again on some of these
practical considerations about continuity.
So if you look at the founding vision of the executive branch, its
energy, its unity, its vigor, its dispatch, but one of the central ideas
is one person always there, 24/7/365, and that is why you have this
constitutionally designated understudy of the Vice President, who
immediately takes over. That is why you have a provision that if
both of them are out of action, there needs to be someone at every
instant.
In England, there is an idea of complete continuity: ‘‘The King
is dead. Long live the King.’’ At every instant, our system actually
has to have a President, and we should be certain who that person
is, and the Commander in Chief line of military chain of command
needs to know exactly who the President is at every instant. And
the Speaker of the House is actually quite unfortunately designed
with that practical consideration in mind.
Mr. WASSERMAN. There was also a partisan concern that President Truman expressed to Congress that he wanted party continuity, if at all possible, and having settled on legislative succession, he acted on the belief that the House was more likely to be
in party agreement, therefore the Speaker more likely to be in
party agreement, than was the Senate. That has not been—
Chairman LOTT. If you see this chart over here, that has not
been the case.
Mr. WASSERMAN. That has not proven to—
Chairman LOTT. The last 50 years.
Mr. WASSERMAN. But that is a product of the post—that type of
divided Government I think is more of a product of the post-World
War II society. I think prior to 1945, there was some validity or
certainly more validity than there has been since the statute has
been in place.
Senator DODD. Dr. Fortier, you raised the issue of certain Cabinet officers, junior status, may be ill-equipped to perform the functions of the Presidency. Isn’t it, though, in a sense—I mean, given
the fact that you would expect the sort of rallying around, on the
assumption most Presidents have some fairly competent people
around a Cabinet table, the fact that the line of succession may fall
to someone who would be of more junior status, maybe less experienced—just think of this Cabinet, for instance. You look at Donald
Rumsfeld or Colin Powell. You move on down the line. You could
choose someone who may not have the same experience. And yet
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having those individuals around would certainly minimize,
wouldn’t it—it is a question—the lack of experience that a more
junior member of that Cabinet might have if, in fact, it fell to that
individual?
Mr. FORTIER. My proposal is that the top five or top four—and
we are talking about putting the Homeland Security Secretary in
there as five Cabinet members—are always going to be very substantial figures that have some connection to national security, if
we are talking about a catastrophic attack, which by definition we
are if we are going down the line to people with those sort of qualifications.
My additional proposal is that we have some offices created
around the country with some substantial figures in them—the eligible sitting Governors or former Presidents, former Vice Presidents, Cabinet members, Members of Congress—who are—if we
can create a way for them to be tapped into the current administration as advisers and coordinators for their regions of homeland
security, those people, I argue, may be more qualified or more—we
would feel more comfortable with them assuming the Presidency in
an extreme circumstance than a Cabinet member of other departments who were probably picked for more specific policy reasons—
knowledge of the field of education, knowledge of the field of agriculture.
We could, by having these additional offices, make it a point that
the main reason for having these people is to assume the Presidency in the worst case, and we are being explicit that that is why
they are chosen rather than as a secondary reason.
Senator DODD. Mr. Baker suggests, obviously, using Governors
as part of this, but I gather the rest of you would have some hesitancy about having a Governor be very high up in a line of succession. But yet you just suggest somehow that having Governors of
part of some elongated list would make some sense. Is that correct?
Mr. FORTIER. I think that we are not too far off, Mr. Baker and
I. I think—
Senator DODD. Make a case for me in light of the California case
here pending now.
[Laughter.]
Senator DODD. Here is that large State and a California Governor I presume would be—that would be sort of a natural choice.
In light of what is going on in California, would you really want
this to—
Mr. BAKER. Senator, it depends upon the Governor. And that is
why the President should have the discretion. I do not think the
Congress should designate by State and say we will start off with
California, New York, and Texas in that order. I think these kinds
of questions are best left to the President’s discretion and his judgment who is among the pool of Governors of his party who is best
suited to serve him. So if the President were allowed to nominate
a sitting Governor and have that person confirmed by the Senate
to be in this contingent role, I think that would provide a successor
outside of Washington.
Senator DODD. It would add a whole new dimension to the nomination process here, wouldn’t it?
Mr. BAKER. It is always fun, Senator.
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Chairman LOTT. Senator DeWine, thank you for being here for
the entire hearing, and we would be glad to hear your questions.
Senator DEWINE. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me just
thank our panelists. I think you have some absolutely excellent
suggestions. There is only one suggestion, I think, that is a little
troubling to me, and that is the idea of the special election. Harry
Truman is one of my favorite Presidents, but I think it is just a
bad idea, and let me tell you why.
I think the last thing in a time of crisis that we need is uncertainty, and what we do is certainty. And the idea on September
11th that, if something had happened to President Bush, that we
would have faced with a new President the specter of a special
election in, say, 6 months is to me frightening. What we would
have needed at that time is certainty that that man or woman who
was the new President would have been able to serve the full term.
That person would have been the President of the United States,
and everybody in the world would have known it. And the idea that
we would have faced a special election in 6 months I think to me
is chilling. And so I think it is a horrible idea. Just the day and
age we live in today I think it is just not a good idea. I do not think
it was a good idea in 1945. I think Harry Truman did real well
from 1945 to 1948, and I think history shows that. So just my comment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LOTT. Senator Cornyn?
Senator CORNYN. Senator DeWine, I share your concerns about
an election. As a matter of fact, last week, talking about the continuity of Congress, we have some competing proposals—one as a
statutory fix, the other would be a constitutional amendment. And
I guess perhaps again for the reason I stated earlier, because of the
oft-stated concern about constitutional amendments and the difficulty in Article V in actually getting a constitutional amendment
passed and ratified, the statutory fixes were proposed, including expedited elections.
But one of the concerns that I would have about a quick election
is, number one, the disenfranchisement of military voters, for example, that is a concern, not to mention in the wake of a 9/11 or
worse the kind of chaos that would reign while we were trying to
conduct an election process.
So while obviously elections are important, ultimately there
would be an election, but at least in the interim, I think stability
and the need to provide some calm and clarity lest we get into
more litigation or uncertainty is, I think, an initial process whereby
it would devolve to another officer, as we have discussed earlier, it
is far preferable to even an expedited election under those circumstances. But I would be glad to—Professor Amar, do you have
any thoughts in that regard?
Mr. AMAR. In an earlier, pre-9/11 article, I did suggest that if the
statute were revised, I added just in the paragraph that we should
really think about providing for a special election 8 months later.
I was not thinking about 9/11 in 1996, and my main suggestion
was to cure the unconstitutionality by pulling the legislative leaders out of the line of succession, and not just the unconstitutionality but the impracticality in a variety of policy settings where
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this might occur. The statute just does not quite work as a practical matter.
There is a tradeoff. To the extent that you get someone who is
very highly validated by the American people as, say, the Vice
President himself has never been, even in 1972, a provision for special election when Presidential power merely was transferred from
President to Vice President, from Franklin Roosevelt to Harry Truman, partly under the idea perhaps that the American people already did vote for this person as their spare, as their next in line.
Now, if you were to create a new office and President as a matter
of custom or to name that person—to tell the American people before the election whom they were going to name, whether it was
whom they were going to name as their Secretary of State, who is
first in line, or whom they are going to name as their First Secretary, then, again, the election itself might have validated that
person to serve out the President’s term, which, of course, is the
25th Amendment model, too. You vote for Nixon, and he had a 4year term, and if he cannot serve it out, it will be Agnew, whom
you voted for; and if not Agnew, Ford, whom he has designated and
who has been confirmed by a special process; and if not Ford, then
Rockefeller. And so, actually, that 25th Amendment model, which
I suggested as a possible template in the event that these things
become—the disability occurs simultaneously rather than sequentially, that is not a special election model.
The special election model might be more suitable if you are
going to very far down the succession list. Then it is a little harder
for the American—and if it is 3 years and 8 months or 3 years and
9 months, very early in a Presidential term, very low down on the
succession list, then there is the anxiety. And I do not think we
would want to have it 2 months later, 3 months later, maybe 8
months or 9 months. And then the question is: Is it worth the candle—if the disability, double disability occurred very early in a
Presidential term, say a month in or at inauguration, it might be
very different than if it occurs 3 years in or even 2 years in.
One final thought, since you talked about the military and people
voting and voting in a crisis. Here is an amazing fact about our history, let’s say, compared to the mother country, England. They do
not have fixed and regular elections in their tradition. Parliament
promised, try septennial elections—I mean triennial elections in
the 1700s and then changed it. But during World War II, there was
no election held in England between 1935 and 1945. Churchill
gives up on Halloween 1944 and tells the House of Commons, ‘‘No
one under 30’’—the generation that is actually making the supreme
sacrifice. ‘‘No one under 30 has ever voted in a general election or
a bye election; whereas, we held regular elections on time, even
during the Great Depression and World War II, because President
Lincoln held an election, one that he actually thought he was going
to lose for a long time, but he held it fair and square on time with
votes coming, the decisive votes, from the field, actually.
So we have been able to run elections, although not special ones,
even during moments of our greatest crises—the Civil War, the
Great Depression, World War II—and, actually other countries
have not always done it, even great democracies like Great Britain.
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Senator CORNYN. Professor Amar, one last follow-up. You noted
in your opening comments that you testified before the Subcommittee on the Constitution in 1994 on this very subject. Is that
correct?
Mr. AMAR. On a very closely related subject.
Senator CORNYN. I do not recall what the context was.
Mr. AMAR. That was about special windows of vulnerability right
around election time and inauguration time. If one of the candidates is knocked out the week before the Presidential election, we
are in serious trouble. If the person who actually won the seeming
vote is knocked out prior to the meeting of the Electoral College,
there are some real areas of difficulty. It is all cited in the notes
to my testimony. I have asked, actually, that that be added to the
record. That was Senator Simon chairing that Subcommittee back
on Groundhog Day 1994.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LOTT. Thank you again, Senator Cornyn, for your
leadership, Senator Dodd, for coming, Senator DeWine, and the
panel, thank you very much. We may have another hearing on this
subject later on, but I hope we can find a way to actually act and
get some results.
In the meantime, I will be talking to Speaker Hastert and President pro tem Ted Stevens about how we get this accomplished.
[Laughter.]
Chairman LOTT. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
[Submissions for the record follow.]
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